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ABSTRACT In Argentina, during the decade of the 1990s major changes were introdu-
ced into the regulatory framework of the national obras sociales, or union-based health 
coverage plans. Using data from the Federal Administration of Public Income (AFIP) 
[Administración Federal de Ingresos Públicos], this study evaluates for the years 2004 
and 2011: a) the importance of obras sociales within the healthcare system, b) the degree 
of concentration of this health social security subsystem, and c) the inequalities in the 
availability of funds among the obras sociales and their beneficiaries. The results show an 
increased importance of obras sociales within the Argentine health system. The concen-
tration of funds distributed to the most important institutions within the subsystem showed 
no change, while the concentration of contributors to these institutions slightly increased 
and that of beneficiaries decreased. Finally, a reduction of the inequalities in funds per 
beneficiary received by different institutions was observed. This trend can be explained, 
among other factors, by the attenuation of wage differentials between branches of econo-
mic activity and the actions of the so-called Solidarity Redistribution Fund.
KEY WORDS Social Security Agencies; Health Care Rationing; Government Regulation; 
Argentina.
RESUMEN En Argentina, durante la década de 1990 se introdujeron grandes cambios 
en el marco regulatorio de las obras sociales nacionales. A partir de datos de la 
Administración Federal de Ingresos Públicos, el presente estudio compara para los años 
2004 y 2011: a) el peso de las obras sociales dentro del sistema de salud argentino; b) 
el grado de concentración de este subsistema de la seguridad social en salud; y c) la 
desigualdad en la disponibilidad de fondos per cápita entre obras sociales y beneficiarios. 
Los resultados revelan un incremento de la importancia de las obras sociales dentro del 
sistema de salud; la cantidad de instituciones se mantuvo prácticamente invariante y la 
concentración de los fondos distribuidos en las entidades más importantes del subsistema 
no muestra cambios, mientras que la de cotizantes aumenta levemente y disminuye 
la de beneficiarios. Además, se registró una reducción en las desigualdades en los 
fondos por beneficiario, la cual podría estar asociada a la atenuación de las diferencias 
salariales entre los diferentes sectores de la economía y al accionar del Fondo Solidario 
de Redistribución.
PALABRAS CLAVES Instituciones de Seguridad Social; Asignación de Recursos para la 
Atención de Salud; Regulación Gubernamental; Argentina.
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INTRODUCTION
The Argentine health system is made up 
of three subsystems: the public system, aimed 
primarily at the population with the lowest 
income and without health coverage; the 
social security system, which offers coverage 
to wage earners incorporated into the formal 
economy and their family members; and 
the private system, which largely attracts a 
medium- to high-income population, offering 
insurance in exchange for payment of a 
premium(1),(2).
The social security subsystem came in-
to being in 1970 with the sanction of Law 
18610, establishing obligatory social insur-
ance for all wage earners and their families 
financed through employee and employer 
contributions calculated as a fixed percent-
age of salaries(3).
This subsystem was organized through 
institutions called obras sociales, non-profit 
organizations offering health insurance. 
In the case of what are known as national 
obras sociales, management is in the hands 
of unions representing each productive 
sector of the economy. There are also pro-
vincial obras sociales which offer coverage 
to the public employees in each jurisdiction, 
obras sociales for management personnel, 
and the National Social Security Institute for 
Retirees and Pensioners (INSSJP) [Instituto 
Nacional de Seguridad Social para Jubilados 
y Pensionados], which offers health services 
coverage exclusively to retired persons and 
those receiving pensions.
Law 18610 also instituted a regulatory 
body, the National Institute of Obras Socia-
les [Instituto Nacional de Obras Sociales], in 
charge of controlling funding and services of-
fered, as well as establishing solidarity mech-
anisms among the different insurers within 
the system. A key tool for achieving the latter 
objective was the creation of what is called 
the Solidarity Redistribution Fund [Fondo 
Solidario de Redistribución], to which all en-
tities are required to contribute 10% of their 
total income. This fund is aimed at diminish-
ing differences in resources existing among 
the obras sociales, a product of – among 
other factors – the different average salaries 
in each economic sector.  To this end, the 
Fund supports financially the obras sociales 
with lower incomes, in order to guarantee af-
filiates access to health services and special 
plans(4).
Until the mid-1980s the trend in the so-
cial security subsystem was towards a con-
stant expansion of coverage, favored by an 
economic context in which the majority of 
the labor force was included in the formal la-
bor market. While in 1967 only 35% of the 
Argentine population had an obra social, cov-
erage reached 75% in 1984(5). Nevertheless, 
at the end of this same decade the efficiency 
of these entities and the presence of inequali-
ties in funding and coverage of health servic-
es among beneficiaries of the different obras 
sociales was being strongly questioned(6).
The problems of efficiency were 
attributed to different causes. The absence 
of competition among entities impeded 
beneficiaries of the system from choosing the 
obra social of their preference, given that they 
were obligatorily affiliated to a single entity 
according to their labor activity. Added to 
this was the regulatory frailty of the National 
Institute of Obras Sociales, which proved 
incapable of limiting coverage for unnecessary 
services offered by wealthier entities, and of 
guaranteeing a minimum coverage to the 
beneficiaries of the poorer entities(5). It was 
argued that these reasons generated a low 
level of efficiency, responsible for the debts 
accrued with service providers(7) and the 
continual increase in the number of staff, 
which was considered excessive in relation 
to the number of affiliates(5),(8).  
Inequalities in funding were also attrib-
uted to the obligatory affiliation by labor 
activity, which segmented the wage-earning 
population according to contribution capac-
ity, with stark contrasts among the different 
obras sociales in terms of coverage offered(6). 
At the same time, discretional mechanisms in 
the allocations of the Solidarity Redistribution 
Fund limited its redistributive effectiveness. 
In this context, between the years 1993 
and 1999, a series of reforms of the social 
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security sector were implemented, affecting 
the great majority of national obras sociales 
– only the obras sociales of the security 
forces and the universities were exempt 
from the national deregulation process. The 
provincial obras sociales were less clearly 
affected, as they were subject to the norms 
of the sub-national government under whose 
jurisdiction they fell. The stated objectives of 
the deregulation and the specific measures 
undertaken to achieve those objectives can 
be summarized as follows:
1. Increase the efficiency of the subsystem 
through the introduction of competitive 
mechanisms among obras sociales(2). 
The system of national obras sociales 
was deregulated and freedom of choice 
was conferred to affiliates, who could 
change insurance providers once a year. 
Nevertheless, and after a number of modi-
fications, it was finally established that the 
choice was limited to obras sociales of the 
same type; it was not possible to move from 
a national union-run obra social to one for 
management personnel or vice versa, nor 
from an obra social to a prepaid medical 
insurance company.
2. Foster more equal levels of coverage by 
defining a minimum package of services, 
known as the Obligatory Medical Program. 
This had to be guaranteed by all insurance 
providers and any provider unable to 
comply would have to be merged with an-
other entity or entities.  
3. Attenuate inequalities in income per af-
filiate among obras sociales, guaranteeing 
a minimum base in the contributions of 
primary affiliates. In this way, all entities 
could cover the cost of the basic package 
of services included in the Obligatory 
Medical Program. To this end, Decree 
292/95 redefines the distribution mecha-
nisms of the Solidarity Redistribution 
Fund, assuring every primary beneficiary 
of the system a minimum contribution. 
Were the worker contribution according 
to his/her salary to be lower than the es-
tablished minimum value, the Solidarity 
Redistribution Fund would automatically 
make up the difference. Additionally, a 
part of this fund would finance costly but 
uncommon treatments incorporated in the 
Administration of Special Programs(3). 
It is important to mention that, although 
there was no explicit incorporation of private 
insurance in the deregulation, the agreements 
by which some national obras sociales 
transferred their affiliates’ contributions 
to a prepaid medical insurance company 
(which would then take responsibility for 
the provision of health services and/or the 
management of the list of beneficiaries) 
allowed these companies to enter the 
social security system, competing with 
the rest of the entities to attract affiliates(9). 
The possibility of establishing differential 
health plans among beneficiaries and obras 
sociales became a means for the companies 
to enter competitively into the system(10). 
Nevertheless, these types of affiliates (called 
“indirect members” by the companies of 
prepaid medical plans) retain their status of 
social security contributors.   
It was hoped that the introduction of 
competition would promote the efficiency of 
the system. With the new regimen, affiliates 
that were not satisfied with the quality and 
coverage of the services offered by their entity 
could exercise the right to change providers. 
If an obra social lost a significant number of 
affiliates, eventually it would have to cease to 
operate. In this way, by incentivizing the con-
centration of users into a smaller number of 
entities, an economy of scale was expected 
to be achieved, reducing administrative costs 
and diversifying risk within each institution.
An aspect to highlight in these regulatory 
changes was the potential conflict between 
introducing competition among entities (by 
allowing the option to change providers) and 
the objectives of increasing coverage and at-
tenuating financial inequalities.
Findling et al.(6) analyzed the early ef-
fects of deregulation. Using data from 1999, 
the authors found that although the number 
of users that exercised their ability to switch 
providers was small in relation to the total, 
the proportion of workers that changed 
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providers increased with salary level. 
Similarly, Fidalgo(9) provides data that in-
dicate that in the period from 1999 to 2005, 
eight of the ten national obras sociales that 
received the largest number of transfers had 
agreements with prepaid medical insurance 
companies. Lastly, Cetrángolo y Devoto(10) 
affirm that the elimination in 1997 of obras 
sociales for management personnel from the 
regulation was due to the fact that these en-
tities were receiving the largest number of 
transfers. As a whole, these results suggest 
that in the first years of deregulation there 
was a shifting in the market to the benefit of 
entities “richer” in relative terms, or to the 
benefit of those that possessed agreements 
with prepaid medical insurance companies. 
If this tendency were to persist, it could be as-
sumed that there would be a progressive de-
funding of the poorer obras sociales through 
the loss of the highest-paid affiliates(6). 
In the decade after the sanction of the 
reforms, the combination of a number of 
factors could have limited the pro-inequality 
tendencies in funding resulting from the 
freedom of choice among obras sociales. 
Firstly, the dynamics of the labor market 
in that period were characterized by a no-
table reduction in salary inequality, owing 
mostly to the more intense reconstitution of 
income for those in the lowest part of the 
income distribution(11). This dynamic was 
marked by a highly favorable economic 
context with strong growth and declining 
levels of unemployment, as well as by the 
regulatory changes in the labor market intro-
duced through the sanction of Law 25877, 
which tangibly modified the framework of 
collective labor agreements and strengthened 
the bargaining power of unions.
 Secondly, the distribution criteria 
of the Solidarity Redistribution Fund and its 
funding structure were progressively trans-
formed: in 2002, contribution percentages 
were increased and differentiated according 
to contributor salary; later, through Decree 
741/2003, the minimum contribution went 
from being assured only for the primary bene-
ficiary to being assured for all beneficiaries (in-
cluding the worker and his/her dependents). 
In this way, larger family groups were as-
sured a greater contribution base. Later, in 
2006, Decree 1901 created the Automatic 
Nominative Subsidy that introduced an ad-
justment for risk in the minimum contribution 
assured to every family member (including 
the primary beneficiary) according to sex and 
age, with the objective of avoiding risk-based 
selection on the part of insurance providers. 
The minimum contributions fixed in the ori-
ginal decree were later updated in 2010 and 
2011(3),(10) (Table 1). 
The objective of the present study is 
to compare for the years 2004 and 2011: 
a) the weight of obras sociales within the 
Argentine healthcare system; b) the degree 
of concentration of this health social security 
subsystem, in relation to the funds received 
and the number of institutions, beneficiaries, 
and contributors; and c) the inequalities in the 
availability of funds per capita among the na-
tional obras sociales and their beneficiaries.
METHODOLOGY
A descriptive, observational and ret-
rospective study was carried out based in 
analysis of quantitative data related to the 
national obras sociales, corresponding to the 
years 2004 and 2011. The selection of this 
time period is due to the fact that although 
effective implementation of the option to 
change providers was carried out through de-
cree 504 in 1998, the period from 1999-2002 
was marked by the most profound economic 
crisis in Argentine history, which limited the 
functioning of social security to a bare mini-
mum. Only after 2003 is it possible to con-
sider that the implemented reforms had an 
impact on the mobility of beneficiaries and 
contributions among obras sociales.
Throughout this work, the affiliates or 
beneficiaries of the national obras sociales are 
understood to be the sum total of contributors 
and their dependents. Contributors are the 
workers employed in the formal sector (from 
whose salary the contribution to the obra 
social is deducted). Dependents are those 
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who receive coverage as a direct family 
member (child, spouse, dependent parent or 
grandchild) of the contributor, but who do 
not contribute from their own salary to the 
obra social of the contributor.
Although it may have been desirable 
in this study to determine the percentage of 
contributors to national obras sociales who 
transfer their contributions to a prepaid medi-
cal insurance company, doing so was not 
possible. The 2010 census specifies the pop-
ulation that accesses a prepaid medical plan 
through a national obra social, however the 
same data is not available through the Feder-
al Administration of Public Income [Adminis-
tración Federal de Ingresos Públicos], which 
was the primary information source utilized.
Regarding the first objective of this 
study, in order to understand the magnitude 
of the participation of national obras 
sociales, we analyzed the relative weight (in 
terms of percentage of total health spending 
represented and population covered) of a) 
the social security subsystem in relation 
to the health system as a whole, and b) 
the deregulated national obras sociales in 
relation to the social security subsystem as 
a whole.
The information on total health expen-
diture by subsystem was taken from the 
Global Health Observatory Data Repository 
of the World Health Organization (WHO)(12). 
The data on the number of inhabitants was 
obtained from the National Population and 
Housing Censuses of 2001 and 2010(13),(14) 
and data on population covered by subsystem 
and type of obra social were obtained, for 
2010, from the report of the United Nations 
Development Programme(3) and, for 2005, 
from Cavagnero et al.(15). Given the impos-
sibility of obtaining coverage information for 
2004, data from 2005 were utilized.
The second objective seeks to study the 
evolution of the level of concentration of the 
subsystem of national obras sociales, given 
that this was the mechanism by which it was 
expected to increase the average efficiency of 
the entities. With this objective, in both years 
analyzed the following was measured: i) the 
quantity of national obras sociales subject 
to deregulation, along with the number of 
beneficiaries and contributors, and ii) the 
percentage of beneficiaries, contributors and 
funds distributed accumulated by the five, 
ten and twenty most important deregulated 
entities, by number of contributors. This 
data was extracted from the AFIP document 
Informe de seguridad social: subsistemas de 
la seguridad social [Report on social security: 
subsystems of social security](16).
Given that the information is provided by 
month, in order to produce annual data the 
funds distributed to the national obras sociales 
over the 12 months of the year were totaled. 
To calculate the number of contributors and 
beneficiaries of each national obra social the 
Table 1. Minimum contributions (in Argentine pesos) of the Solidarity Redistribu-
tion Fund. Argentina, 2006, 2010 and 2011.
Age group
2006 2010 2011
Males
($ pesos)
Females
($ pesos)
Males
($ pesos)
Females
($ pesos)
Males
($ pesos)
Females
($ pesos)
0-14 22.00 22.00 36.00 36.00 47.00 47.00
15-49 35.00 41.00 57.00 67.00 74.00 87.00
50-64 41.00 41.00 67.00 67.00 87.00 87.00
Over 65 99.50 99.50 148.00 148.00 192.00 192.00
Source: United Nations Development Programme(3).
Note: Values expressed in Argentine national currency.
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simple yearly average of the data declared 
for each month was considered. In both 
years analyzed, entities that did not show 
continuous activity over all 12 months were 
excluded from the study[a].
Regarding the third objective, inequali-
ties in the funding in the national obras so-
ciales were studied using the following da-
ta: a) funds distributed annually, by entity, 
including net transfers with the Solidarity 
Redistribution Fund (funds received minus 
funds contributed); b) average annual num-
ber of contributors and beneficiaries by na-
tional obra social; c) average annual salary 
per contributor by entity (estimated using 
the simple average of monthly data for the 
years analyzed).
The data obtained were analyzed using 
descriptive techniques for concentration and 
distribution. To analyze inequalities in the 
availability of funds, the national obras sociales 
were grouped into quintiles according to 
average contributor salary. For each quintile 
of entities, the following was determined: a) 
the percentage represented by the number 
of beneficiaries of the obras sociales in each 
quintile in relation to the entire system; b) 
the average funds distributed per contributor 
and per beneficiary; c) the average number 
of beneficiaries per contributor; and d) the 
simple average contributor salary for each 
group of entities.
A weakness of the previous analysis is that 
it puts all the obras sociales on equal footing, 
regardless of the number of affiliates. In this 
way, in the calculation of averages an entity 
with 300,000 affiliates has the same weight 
as one with 5,000. In order to overcome 
this fault, inequalities in the availability of 
funds among all the affiliates of the system 
were analyzed, grouping them into quintiles 
according to average salary per beneficiary, 
determined by the obra social to which they 
belong. For each quintile of beneficiaries, the 
percentage of corresponding funds distributed 
was calculated. Additionally, the Gini 
coefficient was calculated as a synthesized 
measure of the degree of inequality in the 
distribution of funds.
RESULTS
Importance of the national obras sociales 
within the Argentine health system
Taking into account that the public fi-
nancing of total health expenditure includes 
both the social security and public sub-
systems, in Table 2 a 16% increase from 
2004 to 2011 can be observed. This increase 
occurs at the expense of a reduction of equal 
magnitude in the percentage of private expen-
diture (including out-of-pocket spending and 
private insurance) in total health spending. 
The dynamics of public financing are in large 
part explained by increased funding of the 
social security subsystem (including national 
obras sociales, the INSSJP and provincial 
obras sociales) which increased by 14%.
Other aspects explaining of the financing 
of public health spending can be found in 
the evolution of certain variables in the labor 
market: the relative weight of the economi-
cally active population within the total popu-
lation, which increased from 42.8% in 2004 
to 64.3% in 2010(14); the reduction in the 
unemployment rate that, according to World 
Bank estimates, went from 12.6% in 2004 to 
7.2% in 2011; and the tendency toward for-
malization in the labor market, such that the 
percentage of registered salaried work[b] (con-
sidering both public and private employment) 
increased by 60% in May 2002 and by 64% 
in the second trimester of 2012(17).
Table 2. Percentage distribution of total health 
expenditure by subsystem. Argentina, 2004 and 
2011.
Subsystem 2004(%)
2011
(%)
Social security 29.0 43.0
Public 22.0 24.0
Private 49.0 33.0
Source: Own elaboration using data from the Global Health Observatory 
Data Repository(12).
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In order to determine the importance 
of national obras sociales subject to deregu-
lation within the social security subsystem, 
the percentage of their beneficiaries with re-
spect to the total Argentine population was 
calculated (Table 3).
 An increase in the importance of 
this subset of institutions in terms of the 
percentage of the covered population is ob-
served, with a corresponding reduction in 
the population without explicit coverage and 
therefore covered by the network of public 
health centers. Similarly, the proportion of 
the population with voluntary insurance from 
the private sector also showed an increase of 
nearly 2%. 
Deregulation and concentration
Table 4 shows the quantity of national 
obras sociales and the average annual 
number of contributors and beneficiaries 
during both of the analyzed years, as well as 
the percent variation of each variable in the 
period under analysis.
Contrary to expectation, the number 
of national obras sociales (with continual 
contributions over the course of each year) 
increased slightly. Similarly, the number of 
contributors to the system shows a 64.3% 
increase, accompanied by an increase (albeit 
of a smaller magnitude) in the quantity of 
beneficiaries.
The larger quantity of contributors is 
consistent with the dynamics of the labor 
market in the analyzed period, with an 
important drop in unemployment levels 
and an increase in the economically active 
population and the population with formal 
employment(18). The smaller increase in the 
number of beneficiaries as compared to 
Table 3. Percentage distribution of the popula-
tion according to type of health coverage. Argen-
tina, 2005 and 2010.
Type of coverage
2005
n=38,592,150
(%)
2010
n=40,117,096
(%)
Social security
National obra social 32.0 39.0
INSSJP 8.0 8.0
Provincial obra social 14.0 14.0
Public sector 39.0 30.0
Voluntary insurance 7.0 9.0
Source: Own elaboration based on total populations from the National 
Institute of Statistics and Censuses [Instituto Nacional de Estadísitca y 
Censos(13),(14), data from the United Nations Development Programme(3) for 
2005 and from Cavagnero et al.(15)  for 2010.
INSSJP = Instituto Nacional de Seguridad Social para Jubilados y 
Pensionados [National Social Security Institute for Retirees and Pensioners].
Table 4. Number of obras sociales, average annual number of contri-
butors and beneficiaries, and percent variation of each between 2004 
and 2011. Argentina.
2004 2011 Variation (%)
National obras sociales 288 293 1.7
Contributors 3,974,593 6,530,894 64.3
Beneficiaries 7,331,138 9,666,417 31.8
Source: Own elaboration using data from the Federal Administration of Public Income [Administración Federal 
de Ingresos Públicos](16).
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contributors can be explained by the 
existence of more than one contributor 
per family group (making it unnecessary to 
include the entire family group in a single 
obra social) and/or the incorporation into 
the labor market of young people without 
children.
In Table 5, the trends in the concentration 
of the primary entities of the system 
(according to number of beneficiaries) with 
respect to contributors, beneficiaries and 
funds distributed are analyzed.
There is no clearly defined trend regarding 
the level of concentration of the system. 
While the concentration of contributors 
increased in all the categories considered, 
that of beneficiaries fell slightly (between 
2% and 3%). Similarly, the percentage of 
funds received by the most important entities 
according to their number of beneficiaries 
showed practically no change.
Distribution of the funds of national obras 
sociales 
Table 6 groups the obras sociales in 
quintiles according to average salary of the 
contributors of each entity for the years 
2004 and 2011. The percentage of affiliates 
belonging to obras sociales of the first and 
second quintile (the poorest in relative terms) 
reduced by 9% and 7% respectively. At the 
same time the top three quintiles increased 
coverage by 2%, 8% and 4%, respectively. 
The ratio between funds per beneficiary 
of the obras sociales from the first and fifth 
quintiles reduced to 2.94 in 2004 and 2.44 
in 2011 (17%). Inequalities in funds per 
contributor between these quintiles behaved 
similarly, reducing 9.5%.
A reduction in the differences in average 
contributor salary between the highest and 
lowest quintiles was also observed (28%), 
which can be explained (at least partially) 
by the evolution of inequalities in funds per 
beneficiary and per contributor. Nevertheless, 
to the extent that for both years analyzed 
the difference in salaries is greater than the 
differences in funds per contributor, the role 
played by the Solidarity Redistribution Fund 
in attenuating funding inequalities is clear.
A reduction in additional dependents 
per contributor is seen in all quintiles 
in the analyzed period. This may be a 
consequence of the demographic changes 
between censuses (2001-2010), in which the 
population under 14 years of age dropped 
from 28.3% to 25.5% of the total population, 
while the population between 15 to 64 
Table 5. Percentage of contributors, beneficiaries, and funds distributed in na-
tional obras sociales with the greatest number of beneficiaries. Argentina, 2004 
and 2011.
NOS ordered 
according to 
number of 
beneficiaries
Contributors 
(%)
Beneficiaries
(%)
Funds distributed  
(%)
2004 2011 2004 2011 2004 2011
5 largest 29.0 35.0 35.0 33.0 29.0 30.0
10 largest 44.0 47.0 47.0 45.0 44.0 45.0
20 largest 59.0 62.0 62.0 59.0 62.0 60.0
Source: Own elaboration using data from the Federal Administration of Public Income [Administración Federal de Ingresos 
Públicos](16).
NOS = National obras sociales.
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years increased from 61.8% to 64.3%. This 
demographic shift has its correlation in the 
mean number of children born per woman[c], 
which for the country as a whole has dropped 
from 3.1 children per woman in 2001 to 2.9 
in 2010, evidencing a reduction in fertility 
rates in the last decade.
Table 7 compares the evolution of funds 
distributed among beneficiaries of the system. 
The beneficiaries of national obras sociales 
are grouped into quintiles according to the 
average amount of funds per beneficiary, 
determined by the obra social to which they 
belong. In this way, the first quintile is made 
up of the 20% of beneficiaries that receive 
the least amount of funds per capita, while 
the fifth quintile is made up of the 20% with 
the greatest amount of funds per capita.
Based on the analyzed data, it is possible 
to affirm that between 2004 and 2011 the 
differences in funds received per beneficiary 
Table 6. Percentage distribution of total beneficiaries in the subsystem, funds per benefi-
ciary, and dependents per contributor, according to quintiles of obras sociales ordered by 
average contributor salary. Argentina, 2004 and 2011.
Year Quintile of 
obras sociales
Total 
beneficiaries
(%)
Funds per 
beneficiary1
($ pesos)
Funds per 
contributor2
($ pesos)
Dependents per 
contributor
($ pesos)
Average 
contributor salary3
($ pesos)
2004 1 43.3 395.68 672.11 0.70 552.56
2 17.6 442.79 851.22 0.92 870.65
3 13.0 540.56 1,091.60 1.02 1,127.94
4 16.6 804.42 1,582.51 0.97 1,620.57
5 9.5 1,162.67 2,354.75 1.03 3,482.68
2011 1 34.5 2,080.05 2,744.83 0.32 2,273.38
2 11.3 2,448.59 3,578.02 0.46 3,474.02
3 15.3 2,716.38 4,214.65 0.55 4,213.37
4 25.0 3,425.68 5,454.26 0.59 5,779.96
5 13.9 5,085.34 8,696.65 0.71 10,299.61
Source: Own elaboration using data from the Federal Administration of Public Income [Administración Federal de Ingresos Públicos](16).
1Coefficient of quintiles 5 and 1= 2.94 in 2004 and 2.44 in 2011.
2Coefficient of quintiles 5 and 1= 3.50 in 2004 and 3.17 in 2011.
3Coefficient of quintiles 5 and 1= 6.30 in 2004 and 4.53 in 2011.
Note: Values expressed in Argentine national currency.
Table 7. Percentages of total funds distri-
buted according to quintile of beneficiaries. 
Argentina, 2004 and 2011.
Quintiles of 
beneficiaries
Total funds distributed1 
2004
(%)
2011
(%)
1 11.0 13.0
2 14.0 15.0
3 15.0 18.0
4 22.0 22.0
5 38.0 32.0
Source: Own elaboration using data from the Federal Administration 
of Public Income [Administración Federal de Ingresos Públicos](16).
1Coefficiente of quintiles 5 and 1= 3.48 in 2004 and 2.54 in 2011.
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in the first and fifth quintiles tended to reduce. 
This reduction is explained in large part by 
the 6% drop in funds received by affiliates 
of the fifth quintile. However, although the 
percentage of funds received by beneficiaries 
of the first quintile increased, this increase 
was only 2%.
A better measure of the evolution of 
inequalities in the distribution of funds among 
beneficiaries of the national obras sociales 
can be obtained by creating Lorenz curves 
for the analyzed years and calculating the 
corresponding Gini coefficients, allowing for 
an overall view that considers all the quintiles 
of beneficiaries and not just the first and last. 
The Gini coefficient of funds distributed 
among beneficiaries of the national obras 
sociales for the year 2004 was 0.246 and was 
0.185 for the year 2011. These values, along 
with the Lorenz curves (Figure 1), confirm the 
positive trend in relation to the attenuation of 
inequalities.
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
The analysis carried out in this study 
reveals an increase in the relative importance 
of the social security subsystem within the 
Argentine health system in the analyzed 
period. This conclusion is based on the 
increase in the percentage of total health 
expenditure financing this subsystem, as 
well as in the growth of the population 
covered. In particular, while the percentage 
of the population included in the National 
Social Security Institute for Retirees and 
Pensioners increased marginally, and the 
population insured through provincial obras 
sociales as well as the population receiving 
care exclusively in the public subsystem 
decreased in relative terms, the proportion 
of the population covered by national obras 
sociales (subject to deregulation) increased 
by 7% between the years of 2005 and 2010. 
Nevertheless, a weakness of this analysis is 
the omission (due to lack of information) 
of the population of beneficiaries of obras 
sociales who transferred their contributions 
to a prepaid medical insurance company.
Contrary to expected, between 2004 
and 2011 the number of entities in the 
subsystem of national obras sociales did not 
shrink. The favorable economic conditions 
(with their positive impact on the funding of 
all entities), as well as the reluctance of the 
government to shut down obras sociales with 
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Figure 1. Lorenz curves of fund distribution among beneficiaries 
of national obras sociales. Argentina, 2004-2011.
Source: Own elaboration based on data from the Federal Administration of Public Income 
[Administración Federal de Ingresos Públicos](16).
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small numbers of affiliates and with possibly 
greater financial difficulties, are some of the 
factors that explain this result.
The large number of entities contrasts with 
the highly concentrated nature of the system: 
20 entities (out of approximately 290) have 
close to 60% of all contributors, beneficiaries 
and funds in the two years analyzed. That 
said, a moderate rise in the concentration 
of contributors among the most important 
entities (according to number of contributors), 
a fall in the concentration of beneficiaries and 
a lack of change in the concentration of funds 
distributed was observed.
The increase in the concentration of 
contributors (and not of beneficiaries) can be 
attributed to the dynamics of affiliate transfers 
and the new incorporation of workers into the 
formal labor market.
Transfers among obras sociales are 
especially common in young people, single 
and without children, who receive the best 
offers for differential coverage plans. Given 
that in these transfers the ratio between 
beneficiaries and contributors is lower 
than the average for the whole system, the 
obras sociales that receive these transfers 
might show a reduction in their overall 
beneficiary/contributor ratio. Assuming that 
the principal obras sociales receiving these 
transfers are among the most important of the 
system, these transfers could accentuate the 
concentration of contributors and diminish 
that of beneficiaries.
On the other hand, if in the new 
incorporations to the obras sociales system 
there is also an important representation of 
young people without children or in two-
income homes, and these new incorporations 
tend to be within the most important entities, 
the result would also be an increase in the 
concentration of affiliates and a drop in that 
of beneficiaries.
Lastly, the lack of changes in the 
concentration of funds in the most important 
entities (according to number of contributors) 
is consistent with the distributive function of 
the Solidarity Redistribution Fund.
By taking as the unit of analysis nation-
al obras sociales and grouping them into 
quintiles according to mean salary per con-
tributor in each entity, a reduction of the 
differences between the average salaries of 
the first and last quintiles can be seen in the 
period studied. The dynamics of the formal 
labor market, with a reduction in the differ-
ences among salaries from different produc-
tive sectors (and therefore different unions) 
is the primary factor explaining this trend. 
Nevertheless, it could also be explained by 
the transfer of high-salary contributors to en-
tities with less average income. Although the 
available data and the methodology of analy-
sis utilized does not make it possible to cat-
egorically dismiss this last option, it appears 
rather implausible in terms of the incentives 
proposed by the deregulation: for the trans-
fers among entities to be a factor for reduc-
ing salary inequalities, these would have to 
have benefitted the “poorest” obras sociales 
in relative terms, which although technically 
possible, would be counterintuitive. 
Although different studies suggest that in 
the first years it came into effect the freedom 
of choice of obras sociales promoted a 
shifting process that could have accentuated 
inequalities in the funding of national obras 
sociales, the results expressed here suggest 
that in the analyzed period the tendency was 
just the opposite: the differences in funds 
received in per capita terms (considering 
both contributors and beneficiaries) by the 
different entities in the system were reduced. 
At least two complementary factors can explain 
this result.
First, the role played by the Solidarity 
Redistribution Fund, and in particular the 
incorporation of automatic transfers of funds 
to entities considering adjustments for risk due 
to age and sex of the beneficiaries, could have 
reduced incentives for changing providers. 
Similarly, the comparison in both years studied 
of salary differences versus differences in funds 
per contributor or beneficiary put into evidence 
its effectiveness as a redistribution tool.
Second, the tendency towards the 
reduction of inequality in relative salaries 
within the formal labor market, as a result 
of new regulatory frameworks (collective 
labor agreements) and an economic context 
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ENDNOTES
a. The entities excluded for not showing continuity 
throughout the study years were, for the year 2004: Per-
sonal de Maestranza; Personal de Azúcar Ingenio Las 
Toscas; Viajantes de Comercio; Árbitros del Fútbol Ar-
gentino; Asociación de Obras Sociales de Rosario; Em-
pleados y Obreros Gastronómicos de Tucumán; Personal 
Jerárquico Industria Gráfica Argentina; Personal Artes 
Gráficas Chaco; Personal Artes Gráficas Santa Fe; Por-
tuarios de Bahía Blanca; Portuarios Puerto San Nicolás. 
For the year 2011: Personal Azúcar Ingenio Río Grande 
and Personal Auxiliar Casas Particulares.
b. For this purposes of this study, a person is considered 
to be salaried if he or she receives a salary for work ca-
rried out under an employer. Similarly, a person is consi-
dered to have a registered or formal work relationship if 
his or her salaried work includes retirement deductions. 
c. The mean number of children born per woman is a 
measurement that expresses fertility rates. It is defined 
as the number of children born to women of 45-49 years 
over the course of their reproductive history (retros-
pective fertility) in relation to the total number of women 
of those ages included in the census. It is a measurement 
of longitudinal fertility analysis. 
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